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              No. 35, February 2004 
The Duma elections of last December marked the beginning of a new period in recent Russian history. Communism 
suffered its historic defeat. Furthermore, the end of the Western democratic model has been heralded. A one-party 
system has emerged in the Duma. President Vladimir Putin says that he needs this newly sustained power in order to 
overcome the barriers on the path to establishing a constitutional state and a market economy.  Critics claim that Putin 
is striving to establish a personal authoritarian rule. Conflicts between Russia and the West are again the daily norm. 
Both sides need new concepts of partnership, else the current idea of ‘common spaces’ could regress back to the principle 
of ‘peaceful coexistence’ of the Cold War in the past century. 
 
Between Reform and Restoration: 
Putin on the eve of his second term 
 
The most significant historic event of the 
second half of the 20th century was 
undoubtedly the peaceful collapse of the 
superpower Soviet Union, the disintegration of 
communist ideology and Russia’s turn 
towards democracy and the market economy. 
The strategic partnership between Russia and 
the West became an integral part of the new 
world order. The new Russia began a difficult 
three-dimensional process of transformation, 
from dictatorship to democracy, from a 
centralized planned economy to a market 
economy, and from an Empire to a normal 
European state. 
 
In the 90’s, while traversing this three-
dimensional transformation process, Russia 
came off track. An absence of liberal traditions 
led to misguided political expectations. Two 
economic crises (1991, 1998), the war in 
Chechnya, power struggles between the 
executive and the legislative, Communists and 
democrats, as well as the emergence of a 
corrupt oligarchic regime, all served to 
damage the fragile democratic system, which 
was believed to already have been constituted 
in Russia. In the end, a tattered and sick 
President Boris Yeltsin saw no viable option 
other than to put the stabilization of Russia 
into the hands of the secret services which he 
had tried to abolish before.  
Liberal Politics without liberals 
 
The current developments are full of 
contradictions. President Putin is riding a 
wave of patriotic sympathy without end. His 
popularity remains unabated at 80 percent, the 
Russians trust him more than they do their 
orthodox church. Surveys show that the 
majority of Russians are in favour of Putin’s 
‘dictatorship of law’.  The majority of the 
population perceive the economic model put 
forward by the liberal parties in the 90’s as 
socially unfair and reject it. The early 
democrats are being equated with the oligarch 
regime, which from the perspective of the 
Russian population are responsible for 
plundering Russia’s natural resources in the 
90’s.  
 
80% of Russians asked are in favour of revising 
the results of the privatization of the 90’s, 
disappropriating the billionaires, and 
censuring the press. The arrest of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the CEO of Yukos, had the 
effect of strengthening the Kremlin’s position, 
while the liberals, who sided with the multi-
billionaire, lost out. If it were up to the 
majority, elections, parliament and parties 
could all be abolished. The majority of 
Russians desire a culturally homogenous area 
with collectivist and patriarchical traits, 
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independent ‘Russian’ values and 
consequently its own autonomous national 
interests. Putin’s foreign policy that led to 
Russia no longer being perceived as the loser 
of the Cold War in world politics enjoys broad 
popular support. 
 
Putin has reduced the three-dimensional 
transformation process to one strategically 
important track: the economic modernization 
of the country. The other two transformation 
processes, democratization and decolonization 
have been put on hold. During a trilateral 
American-Russian-German held at the 
German Council on Foreign Relations 
conference in November 2003, the Russian 
expert Gleb Pavlovsky said that Russia had 
lost its statehood twice in the course of the 
20th Century (in 1917 and 1991), and that Putin 
had sworn, that there would not be a third 
revolution in Russia. 
 
This attitude became apparent during the 
Duma elections in December. Russia 
experienced a push to the right. In the Duma 
elections of 2003, intellectuals and 
representatives of the technical intelligence 
gave national-conservative movements 
precedence over the liberal parties. The latter 
were thrown out of parliament, and the 
communists, who had previously provided the 
strongest opposition, lost half of their voters. 
Even the oligarchs, who had influenced and 
misused the executive and legislative with 
their own lobbyists, lost their positions of 
power. 
 
There is also some positive news. In 2001 
Russia adopted the most liberal economic 
reform plan in its history. At its core lies the 
legitimizing of private ownership of land and 
property. The reform is already showing 
results: The economy is reporting stable 
growth, state finances have been sanitized, and 
the dependence on western loans has been 
reduced. The IMF no longer comes to Moscow 
to give the government instructions on how to 
implement reforms. Russia has surpassed 
Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil 
exporter, and has caught up to the US as the 
world’s largest weapons producer. There is a 
tremendous construction boom in Moscow 
and other large cities, huge commercial areas 
are being constructed with international 
supermarkets, over a third of Russians possess 
an expensive mobile phone, the world’s best 
vacation destinations are being flooded by 
Russian tourists, and foreign investors are 
again clambering to get into the Russian 
market. Russia’s government sees good 
chances of catching up to the middle EU 
countries, such as Portugal or Greece, 
economically by 2010. 
 
A system of ‘guided democracy’ has emerged 
in Russia. The state has become the focal point 
of all decision-making processes. The market 
economy is to develop under the supervision 
of the state. Large corporations are being 
forced to subordinate themselves to national 
and state interests.  There is to be no 
government takeover of the industrial and 
financial groups of the oligarchs, the state will 
however attempt to replace the directors of the 
oligarchs’ corporations with loyal managers. In 
the energy sector, the state will also secure the 
largest part of the profits from the export 
business. A kind of state-capitalism is 
emerging in Russia. Only in this manner does 
Putin think he can master the problem of 
corruption, develop social programs to protect 
the poor, secure long-term economic growth 
and strengthen the country towards the 
outside. The failure of Western democracy is a 
price he is willing to pay. Without civil society 
and the adoption of European value systems 
Russia will however remain non-eligible as an 
integration partner to the West. 
 
In August 1999 Yeltsin presented his successor 
to the world. Putin, according the departing 
Kremlin chief, would be the ideal leader for a 
new generation of young politicians, who 
would finally guide Russia to democracy in 
the 21st century and anchor the country in 
Western civilization. However, the famous 
young reformers of the 90’s that Yeltsin 
referred to, do not belong to the leadership 
ranks. Instead, young lawyers, businessmen 
and members of the secret service from St. 
Petersburg are behind the levers of power. In 
the early 90’s they were all part of the 
management team of the deceased Mayor and 
Reformer, Anatoly Sobchak. At the time they 
jointly reformed the St. Petersburg economy, 
supervised the privatization of the local state 
assets of the defunct Soviet Union, founded 
new private companies, became in some cases 
entrepreneurs and directors of new 
corporations themselves, and conducted 
business with Europe and the US. 
 
Putin was the ideal right-hand man for 
Sobchak. As deputy mayor he coordinated 
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economic policy activities and secured them 
with the help of the secret service. Sobchak 
was a man of vision; he was the first advocate 
of the idea of a ‘liberal empire’. Sobchak 
wanted to secure reforms through a strong 
state as well. Today the team is attempting to 
implement the tried, tested and also partially 
failed politics that began in St. Petersburg in all 
of Russia, without the visionary Sobchak 
under the pragmatist Putin. After Sobchak was 
voted out of office and persecuted by the state 
judiciary in the second half of the 90’s, the St. 
Petersburg team disappeared from the political 
radar. Today we know that the ‘Pitertsy’ 
cunningly burrowed themselves into the 
presidential administration in Moscow, only to 
emerge in 1998/99 after the sudden rise of 
their ‘leader’ Putin, and in one fell swoop 
dominate and control virtually all domains of 
state power. 
 
The manner as well as the speed, with which 
the new power system was established, 
appears frightening. Everything began with 
Putin’s startlingly sudden rise in August 1999. 
In October 1999 the ‘Unity’ party was created 
to support him, which in December 1999 at 
first go won the most votes at the Duma 
elections. Putin’s rise was accompanied by 
successes in other areas as well: in Chechnya 
the Russian army managed, to its own 
surprise, to reconquer the separatist republic 
within a few months. In March 2000 Putin was 
elected President already in the first round of 
voting. The next coup followed shortly after: 
Putin divided Russia into seven new 
governmental regions, disempowered the 
Federation Council and put the process of 
disintegration that was plaguing the nation to 
an end.  
 
In the following period Putin neutralized the 
so-called ‘red belt’ of communist governors 
who controlled the provinces surrounding 
Moscow, and replaced them with his loyal 
troops.  The oligarchic regime was smashed: 
first Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Guzinsky 
were driven into exile and their finance and 
media empires confiscated by the state. Three 
years later the Kremlin began a general attack 
on the oil giant Yukos, its top managers were 
arrested or driven out of the country. 
 
The campaign continued in late 2003 with the 
complete obliteration of any opposition from 
the right or the left in the newly elected 
parliament. The communist structures in the 
countryside became marginalized; rivals were 
disempowered or integrated, like the 
‘Fatherland’ party of Moscow’s Mayor Yury 
Luzhkov. Currently the Kremlin possesses an 
absolute two-third majority in the legislative, 
which could easily be expanded to a three-
quarter majority. Putin can now make any 
changes to the constitution that he wishes, be it 
to redistribute Russia’s 89 Regions into bigger 
districts, to extend the presidential term, or to 
reunite Russia with Belarus. 
 
Putin’s power-machinery works perfectly, it is 
geared to maximal control and success. In 
order to secure a victory during the 
presidential elections in Chechnya in 2003 for 
Akhmad Kadyrov, the governor loyal to 
Moscow, all the other candidates were thrown 
out of the race. The Kremlin is pursuing a 
similar strategy in the coming presidential 
elections. A victory for Putin in the first round 
of votes is not sufficient, the Kremlin wants to 
achieve a two-thirds majority, like at the Duma 
elections, as well as surpass the record-
breaking results of Georgian president Mikhail 
Saakashvili, who received 96 percent of the 
votes in his country. 
 
However, Putin understands the dangers of 
the power-apparatus becoming too 
independent. In his first statements after the 
announcement of the results of the Duma 
election, Putin made no secret of the fact that 
he would have rather seen the liberal parties in 
rather than outside of the parliament. Now he 
will not fulfill his earlier promise to have the 
next government be selected by parliamentary 
majority. Putin cannot run liberal economic 
policy entirely without liberal politicians. For 
this reason, the president did not congratulate 
the victors of the Duma elections for their 
triumph, but instead called on the liberals to 
cooperate. Those that placed their bet on the 
strengthening of the secret service structures 
were mistaken.   
 
In the presidential administration the 
emphasis was shifted from the ‘siloviki’ (the 
representatives of the power structures) to 
Putin’s civilian advisors (Dmitry Medvedev, 
Dmitry Kozak). Putin also knows exactly what 
signals he has to send the West, in order to 
receive the necessary investments for his 
modernization policy. Grigory Javlinsky, who 
was defeated in the election, stated in Berlin: 
‘Putin is the last dam against the rising 
nationalism’. 
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Conflicts with the West 
 
Putin’s domestic politics of order are raising 
suspicions in the West, which is affecting 
foreign policy as well. Observers forecast a 
conflict-laden year for the relations between 
Russia and the West. At the beginning of 
Putin’s first term in office, it appeared as 
though Russia had returned to the foreign 
policy of Andrei Kozyrev (1990-95). Putin 
declared the integration of his country into the 
world economy to be the priority of his 
politics. In the German Bundestag, shortly 
after 9/11, he explained Russia’s intention to 
fuse its Siberian natural resource reservoir 
with the European economic area.  In return 
the EU was to provide the technical know-how 
for the modernization of the Russian economy. 
The EU and Russia would have to unite, in 
order to guarantee Europe’s position as a 
superpower in the 21st century. 
 
However, the West responded with 
reservation to such proposals of a more 
profound partnership. The reform process in 
Russia was raising too many puzzling 
questions. The path to a truly joint European 
house leads from the establishment of a 
common canon of values, to the reconciliation 
of Russia with the former Warsaw Pact states 
(the new EU members), to a radical reform of 
the Russian industrial and service sectors, the 
establishment of mid-tier enterprises, and a 
functioning banking sector. Europe will never 
and can never define itself in opposition to the 
United States. Moreover, if Russia desires to 
become an integral part of Europe, it must be 
prepared to transfer sovereignty rights to 
Brussels, which is completely out of the 
question for the current Russian elite. 
 
Relations between Russia and the West have 
deteriorated in the years 2002/2003. Russian 
diplomacy resembles once more that of 
Evgeny Primakov (1996-98), who did not shy 
away from conflicts with the West, in order to 
push through Russian national interests more 
forcefully. Since then, Russia is in conflict with 
the EU over the prospective configuration of 
the European continent.  Since the introduction 
of visas for Russians, who travel to and from 
Kaliningrad, the highly praised strategic 
partnership between the EU and Russia has 
been placed on the back burner. Putin has 
made it unequivocally clear to the EU that 
criticisms and instructions will no longer be 
accepted, Russia does not need the EU as a 
teacher of democracy, but rather solely as a 
partner in the modernization of the Russian 
economy. 
 
Other Russian politicians, like the former 
advisor to the Prime Minister Mikhail 
Delyagin for example, dismiss a pure EU-
Europe, within which Russia possesses no vote 
on security and economic issues. He believes 
that while Russia would move away from 
Europe, the Western Europeans will fill the 
vacuum with their military and economic 
structures. The Russian ‘near abroad’ has 
suddenly become the ‘near aboard’ of NATO 
and the EU. The Eastern Europeans returned 
to Europe with a feeling of colossal historic 
relief, whereas Russia on the other hand would 
be pushed back into a foreign Asian 
civilization. From the Russian perspective, 
Russia was not rewarded by the US for its role 
in the Anti-Terror-Alliance since 9/11. On the 
contrary, according to the Russians, the US is 
declaring the southern CIS countries, which 
Russia considers part of its own sphere of 
influence, as belonging to their hemisphere. 
They are pushing Russia not only out of 
Central Asia, but also out of the Caucasus, 
Moldavia, and even the Ukraine.  
 
In response to this, Putin has attempted to 
accelerate the process of reintegration in the 
former Soviet territories in the last months, 
with Kazakhstan appearing to be his most 
important ally. Russia and Kazakhstan are 
linked by similar perspectives on reform, 
democracy and market economics. Dariga 
Nazarbayeva, the head of the ‘Asar’ party in 
Kazakhstan and the daughter of the head of 
state, stated in her presentation at the German 
Council on Foreign Relations in December 
2003, that the Kazakh political system could 
not be measured according to Western 
standards. Only countries with a high 
standard of living could afford a ‘Western 
democracy’. Her country would take over the 
civil society structures and market economy of 
the West, without denying their own 
traditional Kazakh values. 
 
Exactly the opposite is occurring in Georgia. 
There the newly elected 36 year-old president, 
Mikhail Saakashvili, who ousted Eduard 
Shevardnadze with his ‘rose revolution’ in 
November 2003, has begun a radical approach 
in order to integrate Georgia into the West as 
quickly as possible. In his speech at the 
German Council on Foreign Relations at the 
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end of January 2004 in front of 700 guests, he 
described the revolution of roses in his country 
as a model for the neighbouring states in the 
region. Since the ‘velvet revolutions’ in Central 
Eastern Europe 15 years ago, the time has 
come for a democracy that was fought for by 
the people and not ordained from above, to 
manifest itself now on post-Soviet territory.  
 
Following the war in Iraq in 2003, Georgia 
could become the new source of conflict 
between Moscow and Washington. US 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell have put 
extensive pressure on Russia to clear the 
Caucasus of its military bases. Russia fears that 
after it withdraws its troops from Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, they will be invited to join NATO. 
The Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov 
rejected a Russian troop withdrawal 
reminiscent of the one from East Germany in 
the early 90’s.  
 
However, Putin is enough of a pragmatist to 
understand that there are limits to both the 
policies of a radical opening to the West, as 
well as those of a singular pursuit of Russia’s 
great power interests. Consequently, there will 
most likely be little change in the policies of 
Putin’s second term. Nevertheless the West 
must respond as well. The driving out of 
Russia into Asia could have grave 
consequences for the West. Without a 
democratic Russia with a free market 
economy, the rest of the European continent is 
unlikely to continue to live in stability and 
prosperity. There is no avoiding an 
intensification of dialogue with Russia, even if 
it is acting increasingly self-assured.  
 
It has gone unnoticed in the West that Putin 
has been on the lookout for other potential 
strategic partners in world politics for the past 
few months. The Kremlin has actively taken 
steps to approach the Muslim world, with the 
intention of entering the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, since there appears to be 
no signs of a common economic area with the 
EU in the near future. Putin has already been 
able to harvest one success. While the EU still 
denounces Russia for the conflict in Chechnya, 
Saudi Arabia has acknowledged Kadyrov as 
the president of Chechnya, and has ended its 
former support of the Chechen rebels. 
 
The Russian expert Christian Meier has 
advised the government of Germany in a 
study from the ‘Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik’ to continue steadfastly with the 
developed concepts and mechanisms of the 
EU-Russia relationship. However, the options 
the West has at its disposal of influencing 
Russia are more limited than in the 90’s. 
Russia’s dependence on Western loans has 
diminished rapidly and the West lacks like-
minded democratic counterparts for dialogue 
in the Russian ruling elite. The most significant 
contacts to Russia will most likely emerge 
through the economic sector, the coming year 
will certainly provide positive news in this 
area. It will be increasingly difficult however 
to cultivate interparliamentary relations with 
an overly nationalistic Duma, for which the 
reestablishment of former Russian might is 
more important than its partnership with the 
West. 
 
The anxious question to pose is whether Putin 
will remain on his course of reform and 
modernization, continue his policy of opening 
to the West or become prisoner to the new 
power constellation in Moscow, which could 
enforce upon him a more nationalistic course. 
One can eagerly anticipate the coming 
personal changes at the top of the leadership. 
They will be an important indicator for Putin’s 
future course.  
By Alexander Rahr 
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